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NOTE
WHAT DOES DIVERSITY
MEAN IN SEATTLE?:

PARENTS INVOLVED IN
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT
NUMBER 1 STRIKES DOWN THE
USE OF A RACIAL TIEBREAKER
INTRODUCTION

Prior to the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, public school districts were constitutionally permitted to segregate based on race.' Under the "separate
but equal" doctrine, substantially equal facilities, although
separate, were considered equal treatment: In Brown, the disputed Kansas statute permitted, but did not require, separate
school facilities for black and white students! The Court considered the impact of public education on American life and
found it to be one of the most important functions of state and
local governments .. Accordingly, it described education as "the
very foundation of good citizenship."· As a result, the Court
held that the doctrine of "separate but equal" had no place in
, Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
2Id. at 488 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896».
3Id. at 486.
• Id. at 492-93.
• Id. at 493.
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the field of public education because students would be deprived equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment.6
Despite Brown's groundbreaking decision, schools did not
become integrated simultaneously with the ruling:' The decision in Brown illustrated a desire to change, but when combating many years of racial discrimination, a mere desire to
change was not enough.6 The courts attempted to remedy the
problem with court ordered desegregation through injunctions. 9
Today, educational and professional institutions have evolved
beyond equitable injunctions by establishing affirmative action
polices.'o
However, over fifty years later, our educational system
still displays significant remnants of past discrimination. 11 The
standard of living for blacks in the United States still resembles the pre-1970 levels." Although there were immediate
gains in education as a direct result of Brown, many of those
gains have since been lost.'3 Children of color, particularly African Americans and Latinos, often attend substantially segregated and poorly funded primary and secondary schools." Although many African Americans' access to better education has
improved since Brown, the desire for an integrated society continues to be an aspiration rather than a reality.'5
The Seattle School District (hereinafter "School District")
is an illustration of a racially segregated school system in the
United States today.'6
Seattle's housing patterns create
• Id. at 495 (reasoning that if one race was inferior socially, then the Constitution could not put the two races on the same plane).
7 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (setting forth broad guidelines to
desegregate).
8 See generally Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(permitting school district to rearrange student busses to desegregate the school system).

9Id.

I. See
infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
Linda Carty & Paula C. Johnson, The Impact of Brown; Fifty Years Later, Still

11

More Rhetoric Than Commitment, THE POST STANDARD/HERALD-JOURNAL, Apr. 15,
2004 atA13.
12 Id.
13 Id.
,. Id.
If> Id.
1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 137 F. Supp. 2d
1224, 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2001), rev'd, 377, F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, 395
F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. Feb. 1,2005) [hereinafter Parents Involved n.
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neighborhoods that are noticeably segregated by race.17 Most of
the city's white residents live in the northern, more affluent
end of the city/8 whereas, "a majority of African American,
Asian American, Hispanic American, and Native American
residents live in the south.",9 Thus, a public school's districting
program based on a student's geographic proximity to the
school would mirror the racial isolation evident in Seattle's
neighborhoods. 20
After Brown, courts around the country ordered school districts to desegregate while Seattle's school board voluntarily
explored options to ensure that students had access to diverse
schools with equal opportunities!! For example, in 1998, the
School District employed an "open choice" policy to assign students to its ten public high schools. 22 This policy gave students
and their parents the opportunity to choose their preferred
high schools!3 However, as expected, when students ranked
their top choices, a disproportionate number of students chose
the more prestigious schools!' The school board decided that in
order to allow all students access to the more popular schools,
they would employ a tiebreaker system, which elevated race
over a student's geographic proximity, and a lottery to determine which students were assigned to the more prestigious
schools. 25
Id. at 1225.
Id.
19Id. "74.2 percent of the [School District'sl Asian students, 83.6 percent of its
black students, 65.0 percent of its Hispanic students, and 51.1 percent of its Native
American students live in the southern half of the city. By contrast, 66.8 percent of the
[School District'sl white student population lives in the northern half of the city."
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 377 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir.
2004), reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2005), !hereinafter Parents Involved 11].
20 Parents Involved 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
21Id.
22 Id. at 1226.
23 Id.
24 Id.
"Approximately 82 percent of students selected one of the oversubscribed
high schools as their first choice, while only about 18 percent picked one of the undersubscribed high schools as their first choice." Parents Involved 11,377 F.3d at 955. The
variation in schools was measured by factors such as "standardized test scores, numbers of college preparatory and Advanced Placement (AP) courses offered and the
availability of an Internal Baccalaureate (IB) program, percentages of students taking
AP courses and SATs, percentages of graduates who attend college, Seattle Times college-preparedness rankings, University of Washington rankings, and disciplinary statistics." Id. at 954 (footnote omitted).
25 Parents Involved 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
!7
18
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The first tiebreaker admitted students whose siblings already attended the oversubscribed school. 26 This tiebreaker
accounted for roughly "15 percent to 20 percent of high school
assignments.'l27 If the school was still oversubscribed, the policy allowed for the second tiebreaker, which elevated race over
proximity!S The School District adopted this controversial tiebreaker to diversify schools that were deemed to be racially
isolated!9 The School District determined that a school was
racially "out of balance" if it "deviates by more than fifteen percent from the overall racial breakdown" of the students attending Seattle's public schools. 30 At the time, white students accounted for forty percent of the city's schools. 31 The student's
race was specified on the registration fonn which was filled out
by a parent in person."2 If the parent chose not to identify a
racial category, the School District would assign a category
based on the parent's appearance:3
Next, if the school was still oversubscribed after using the
racial tiebreaker, then the School District applied a third tiebreaker:' This tiebreaker determined admittance based on
geographic proximity to the school. 35 If the first three tiebreakers continued to keep the school over-subscribed, then the
School District employed a· random lottery as the final tiebreaker:6
A non-profit corporation, Parents Involved in Community
Schools, filed suit over the School District's "open choice" policy. The non-profit corporation was "fonned by parents whose
children have been or may be denied admission to the high
schools of their choosing solely because of race."3' It alleged
that the School District's use of race engaged in illegal racial
discrimination prohibited by the Washington Civil Rights Act,
26 Parents Involved II, ·377 F.3d at 955.
27Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
31Id.
32 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 955.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 956.
35 Id.
36 Id.
The lottery "rarely [was] invoked because distances [were] calculated to
one hundredth of a mile for purposes of the [third] tiebreaker." Id.
37 Id.
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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.38
This Note examines the Ninth Circuit decision in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1.39 The introduction provides an overview of the evolution
of race-based jurisprudence.·o In addition, the introduction describes the "open choice" policy established by the School District. 41 Part I explains the progression to strict scrutiny as the
applicable standard of review for race-conscious admissions
policies.·2 Part II analyzes the procedural history of the Parents
Involved cases." Part III compares the admissions policies between public high schools and universities." Part IV proposes a
constitutionally permissible race-conscious placement policy for
secondary education!· Part V concludes that although the
Ninth Circuit correctly held that the School District's "open
choice" policy was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, future cases may require a more
extensive examination of the differences between high school
and university admissions, especially under the latest policies
outlined in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger.·s
I.

BACKGROUND

Historically, discrimination based on race involved "discrete and insular" minorities.· For this reason, the applicable
authority and standard of review for discrimination against the
white majority entailed many years of debate:8
7

38

[d.

See infra notes 172-254 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 47-171 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 172-254 and accompanying text .
.. See infra notes 255-285 and accompanying text .
.. See infra notes 286-316 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 317-320 and accompanying text.
" See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) .
.. See infra notes 70-171 and accompanying text.
39
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THE HISTORY OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS

Racial discrimination claims are often brought under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'· One purpose of Title VI was
to permit the Executive Branch to terminate federal funding of
private programs that unlawfully used race-based discrimination. 50 In pertinent part, it provides that, "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. "51 It was meant to
"assure the existing right to equal treatment" when utilizing
federal funds. 52
In addition, racial discrimination claims are brought under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmenea
Initially, the Supreme Court's position on the Fourteenth
Amendment was that it had "one pervading purpose."54 That
purpose was "the freedom of the slave race, the security and
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the
newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those
who had formerly exercised dominion over him."55 While the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was frequently used by the Supreme Court to defend property and the
liberty of contract, the Equal Protection Clause remained dormant.56 During this period, "the United States became a Nation
of minorities."57 As a result, the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment no longer attached to equality rights for only one
racial minority. 58 Accordingly, the Court has instated three

" See id, 438 U.S. at 328-42.
60 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328-29 (1978) (plurality
opinion) [hereinafter Bakke].
51 [d. at 328 n.7 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d» .
• 2 [d. at 330.
63 [d. at 291 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36, 71 (1873».
The Fourteenth Amendment commands, "No State shall ... deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protections of the laws." [d. at 289 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1)
(alteration in original) .
.. [d.

[d.
56 [d. at 291-92 .
• 7 [d. at 292.
68 [d.
56
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standards of review to analyze claims under the Equal Protection Clause. 59

B.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR VARIOUS EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAIMS

The three standards of review recognized by the Supreme
Court to test alleged equal protection violations are rational
basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny:o Rational
basis is the least demanding level of scrutiny used to analyze
equal protection violations. Courts utilize this level of review
when the classification being discriminated against has not
been elevated to a "suspect class."62 To satisfy rational basis,
the legislation must serve a legitimate government purpose. 63
The next level of review is intermediate scrutiny.6' Discrimination based on gender is scrutinized under this standard of review.65 In order to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, legislation
must serve an important governmental purpose that is substantially related to the goal. 66 Traditionally, laws that classify
people differently based on race are examined under the most
exacting level: strict scrutiny.67 To satisfy strict scrutiny, the
legislation must serve a compelling governmental interest that
6l

See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
Id.
6l See generally Goesaert v. Cleary, 74 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Mich. 1947) (involving
a 1948 law that prohibited women from being bartenders, unless the bar was operated
by her husband or father), affd, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), overruled by Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976). The Court used rational basis for gender discrimination at this time.
Id. at 738.
62 See generally Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (declining to make gender a
"suspect class").
63 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
64 See generally Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (raising the level of scrutiny from rational
basis to intermediate scrutiny for discrimination against either gender).
65 Id.
56 Id.
67 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1944) (involving a conviction under the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause for violating a military
order during World War II that excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry from designated West Coast areas), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2a, 102 Stat. 903
(1988); Strauder v. West Va., 100 U.S. 303, 304, 306 (1880) (concerning a black defendant convicted of murder by a jury from which blacks had been excluded); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 356, 369 (1886) (involving a law that prohibited the operation of
a laundry in wooden buildings without a permit that in application discriminated
against Chinese applicants).
59

60
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is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 68 Although strict
scrutiny is now the applicable standard of review for raceconscious affirmative action policies, the debate ensued for
many years:9
C.

CASE HISTORY

1.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke

The first affirmative action case before the Supreme Court
was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 70 The suit
challenged the admissions program at the University of California at Davis Medical School (hereinafter "U.C. Davis"),
which was designed to admit a fixed number of minority applicants.7I A majority of justices could not agree on the applicable
standard of review." As a result, the decision was published
with six separate opinions. The Court was split, with Justice
Lewis Powell in the middle. 74 Four justices, including Chief
Justice Burger, concluded that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibited U.C. Davis's program. 76 This view avoided
addressing the constitutional issue altogether. 76 Justice Powell
concurred in the judgment that the U.C. Davis program should
be prohibited. 77 However, he reached his conclusion through a
constitutional analysis.
The remaining four justices dis79
sented. These dissenting justices agreed with Justice Powell
73

78

[d.
See infra notes 70-171 and accompanying text.
70 See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
71 [d. at 269-70 (Powell, J. plurality opinion).
72 [d. at 271-72 (Powell, J. plurality opinion).
73 [d.
Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. [d. at 324.
Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun each filed separate opinions.
[d. 380-421. Justice Stevens concurred in judgment and dissented in part and fIled an
opinion that Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist joined. [d. at
325-379.
7. [d. (Powell, J. plurality opinion).
75 [d. at 325 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart,
Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stevens concluded that Title VI prohibited U.C. Davis's
program. [d.
76 [d. (Brennan, J. dissenting).
77 [d. at 325-26 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
76 [d.
79 [d. at 325 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice
Marshall, and Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Powell that a constitutional
analysis was appropriate. [d. at 324.
68

69
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that ''Title VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of race
than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'o However, unlike Powell, the dissent analyzed the V.C.
Davis program under intermediate scrutiny and upheld it as a
constitutional use of race.'l Justice Powell's opinion provided
crucial guidelines in the affirmative action arena because his
vote was necessary to obtain a majority."'
Nevertheless, V.C. Davis undeniably used a race-based
classification in its admissions program. sa The Court previously
decided racial and ethnic minorities of any sort were inherently
suspect and therefore called for the "most exacting judicial examination."" Allen Bakke was a white male applicant who was
denied admission both in 1973 and 1974."5 V.C. Davis argued
strict scrutiny was not the applicable standard of review because white males are not a "discrete and insular minority.''''6
In spite of this, Justice Powell concluded that the Court had
never required such a distinction before subjecting racial preferences to strict scrutiny.87 Accordingly, Justice Powell determined Allen Bakke was entitled to a judicial determination of
whether V.C. Davis's policy was "precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.""
Vsing strict scrutiny review, Justice Powell first determined what interests were involved and which interests were
substantial enough to support the use of a suspect classification."· He found that the "special admissions program [at V.C.
80 [d. at 325. A majority of the Court after this point views Title VI as coextensive with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. [d. at 352-53.
81 [d. at 325-26 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
82 See id., 438 U.S. 265 (plurality opinion).
83 [d. at 289 (Powell, J.). The program at the U.C. Davis Medical School set up a
committee to evaluate students who wished to be considered "economically and lor
educationally disadvantaged" applicants. [d. at 273 n.1. No formal definition of "disadvantaged" was given. [d. A specified number of positions were reserved for disadvantaged applicants (16 out of 100). [d. at 289. The committee would present its "top
choices to the general admissions committee." [d. at 275. In 1973, the "total number of
special applicants was 297, of whom 73 were white," while. "[iJn 1974, 628 persons
applied to the special committee, of whom and 172 were white." [d. at 274-75 n.5.
84 [d. at 291 (Powell, J.) (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100
(1943), Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 323 (1944» .
.. [d. at 276 (Powell, J.).
86 [d. at 288 (Powell, J.).
87 [d. at 290 (Powell, J.) (citing Carolene Prods. Co,. 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4).
86 [d. at 299 (Powell, J.).
89 [d. at 305-06 (Powell, J.).
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Davis] purports to serve the purposes of: (i) reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical
schools and in the medical profession; (ii) countering the effects
of societal discrimination; (iii) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved;
and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an
ethnically diverse student body.Justice Powell concluded that Brown and the subsequent
desegregation cases demonstrated that remedying specific acts
of racial discrimination was a judicial and state commitment.9 !
However, remedying specific acts of past discrimination is "far
more focused" than remedying past societal discrimination,
because societal discrimination involves reparations for society
as a whole.92 Justice Powell determined that the Court has
never allowed a preferential classification that assists members
of one group while harming individuals of another without "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional
or statutory violations.rna Thus, without such findings there is
no "compelling justification" to discriminate based on race. 94 As
a result, Justice Powell concluded that if an institution's motivating purpose was to remedy past specific acts, as opposed to
broad societal discrimination, such a purpose could be found
compelling. 95
The third stated purpose was to improve health care services in communities where they were underserved. 96 Powell
concluded that in some situations this purpose would be "sufficiently compelling."97 Even so, Bakke's record failed to show
that U.C. Davis's special admissions program was designed to
promote that goal. 98

90

9!
92

[d. at 306 (Powell, J.).
[d. at 307 (Powell, J.).
[d. (Powell, J.). Remedying past societal discrimination involves a goal of

"reparation by the 'majority' to a victimized group as a whole." [d. at 306 nA3 (Powell,
J.).
93 [d. at 307 (Powell, J.) (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367-76
(1977); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1977); S. Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).
'" [d. at 309 (Powell, J.).
so See id. at 307-10 (Powell, J.).
96 [d. at 310 (Powell, J.).
97 [d. (Powell, J.).
96 [d. (Powell, J.).
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The last purpose asserted by U.C. Davis was to establish a
diverse student body.99 Justice Powell concluded that although
achieving a diverse student body was sufficiently compelling to
consider race in admissions decisions under certain circumstances, the particular special admissions program at U.C.
Davis did not pass strict scrutiny review because it did not employ the least restrictive means. lOO Therefore, he invalidated
the U.C. Davis program under the Equal Protection Clause.
In summary, Justice Powell found racial diversity to be a
compelling aspect of educational admissions decisions. l02 However, race is only one element in a range of factors a university
may consider in attaining its goals of a diverse student body.l03
Nonetheless, because of the division among the Court, the only
holding from Bakke was that a "[s]tate has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of
race and ethnic origin. mo. Despite Powell's constitutional
analysis, the majority authorized the use of affirmative action
in Bakke, but they did not permit the quota program that U.C.
Davis established. l05 As a result, the applicable standard of review for affirmative action programs remained a debate for
more than a decade. IOG
101

.. [d. at 311 (Powell, J.).
[d. at 319-20 (Powell, J.).
101 [d. (Powell, J .).
102 [d. at 314 (Powell, J.)
103 [d.
Powell held that Harvard College's admissions policy was an adequate
program. [d. at 316-24. "Harvard College expanded the concept of diversity to include
students from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic groups." [d. at 316. The
admissions policy at Harvard used race as a factor, but did not allow "target quotas."
[d.
104 [d. at 320 (Powell, J.).
100 [do. at 271 (Powell, J.).
106 See generally United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (holding a negotiated consent decree including numerical hiring in promotional goals for minority employees was permissible); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421 (1986) (fmding minority hiring goals permissible after defendants were found
guilty of engaging in discriminatory practices); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that a collective bargaining agreement that required the retention of probationary minority teachers when nonminority teachers were laid offwas
not permissible); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding a federal program reserving a specified percentage of government contracts for minority contractors), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
100
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Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.

The Supreme Court also analyzed race-conscious hiring
procedures. 107 A majority of the Supreme Court in Richmond u.
J.A. Croson Company determined that the applicable standard
of review for state law was strict scrutiny. 108 The questionable
plan in Croson required the city's prime contractors to "subcontract at least 30% of the [contract's] dollar amount to one or
more Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs)."109 The Court
held that "the Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a [specified] percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race."110 The Court agreed with
the plurality view in Wygant u. Jackson Board of Education
that "the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause
was not [determined] by the race of those burdened or benefited by the particular classification."lll
In addition, the Court decided strict scrutiny was used to
"smoke out illegitimate uses of race" by ensuring the legislation
was necessary, therefore justifying the use of a ''highly suspect
tool. ""2 Thus, they chose to use strict scrutiny as the applicable
standard of review. 113 Accordingly, the Court in Croson held
that the city failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in apportioning their contracts based on race."'
3.

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen a

The Supreme Court also addressed the applicable standard
of review for federal equal protection violations. 115 Adarand
See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
[d. at 493-95.
109 [d. at 477. The Richmond Plan considered a business an MBE if at least fiftyone percent of the business was owned or controlled by minority group members. [d. at
478. The Richmond Plan defined "minority group members" as United States citizens
"who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." [d. The
dispute arose because the J.A. Croson Co. alleged that it was denied work on a city
project because it was not an MBE. [d. at 483.
110 [d. at 493.
III [d. at 494 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 285-86 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Wygant, four members of the Court applied heightened scrutiny to a racebased system of employee layoffs. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270. ("Societal discrimination,
without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy").
112 Croson at 493.
113 [d.
114 [d. at 505.
11. See generally Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
107

lOB
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Constructors, Inc. v. Pena involved the "Federal Government's
practice of giving general contractors on Government projects a
financial incentive to hire subcontractors controlled by 'socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals.'"116 "Race-based
presumptions" were used to determine who was socially or economically disadvantaged. 1I7 The Court in Adarand made it
clear that federal racial classifications, like those of a state,
must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be
narrowly tailored to further that interest. liB Consequently, the
Court determined that all government-imposed racial classifications "must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny. "119
D.

THECOURTANNOUNCESTHESTANDARD

During its 2003 term the Supreme Court decided two cases
which upheld the constitutionality of affirmative action programs. Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger are significant because their rulings set up constitutional parameters for
affirmative action programs at colleges and universities all
over the country.12l
l2O

1.

Grutter v. Bollinger

In Grutter, the University of Michigan School of Law (hereinafter "Law School") sought a "mix of students with varying
backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn from
116 Id. at 204.
The clause addressing the financial incentive stated that "'the
contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals
include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities, or any other individual found to be disadvantaged ... ." Id. at
205 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 687(d)(2), (3)).
117 Adarand at 204.
Adarand was a Colorado-based highway construction company who submitted the low bid for a federal contract. Id. at 205. The Central Federal
Lands Highway Division (CFLHD), a part of the United States Department of Transportation (DOT), was the prime contractor. Id. Adarand alleged that the race-based
presumptions used in compensating contractors violated of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 210.
118 Id. at 227.
119Id.

1" Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding University of Michigan
School of Law's admissions policy), reh'g denied, 539 U.S. 982 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (finding University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and Arts undergraduate admissions program was unconstitutional).
121 See infra notes 122-171 and accompanying text.
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each other."'22 Consequently, the Law School wanted to comply
with the Supreme Court's only ruling involving race in university admissions, which was articulated in Bakke. '23 Barbara
Grutter was a white Michigan resident who applied to the Law
School in 1996. '2• She alleged that the Law School discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. '25
The Law School considered several factors when admitting
students. 126 Among those factors were each applicant's undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score. 127 However, the admissions officials
also considered a series of "soft variables.'''28 These variables
included, "enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate institution, the quality of the applicant's essay,
and the areas and difficulty of undergraduate course selection."'29 The purpose of the "soft variables" was to help evaluate
the applicant's "likely contributions to both the intellectual and
social life of the institution.'''30 As a result, the admissions policy confirmed the Law School's longstanding commitment to
racial diversity, without defining diversity solely in terms of
race. '3'
According to the Director of Admissions, the Law School
tried to achieve a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority
students.'32 He further testified that there was not a specified
percentage of minority students that the school was seeking to
admit. 133 However, he did "frequently consult the 'daily reports'" which monitored the racial and ethnic composition of
selected students to "ensure that the 'critical mass' of underrepresented minority students would be reached."'3. "Critical
122

Grutter. 539 U.S. at 314.
(citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265).
at 316.
at 317.
at 315.

[d.
124 [d.
n' [d.
126 [d.
127 [d.
128 [d.
129 [d.
lao [d.
131 [d.
132 [d.
133 [d.
134 [d.
123

at 315.
at 318.
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mass" was not a specified number, but rather a number that
was large enough to encourage underrepresented minority students to participate without feeling isolated. 135
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeal. 136 First, the Court decided whether there was a compelling governmental interest
underlying the policy behind the Law School's admissions program. 137 The Court deferred to the Law School in assessing
whether diversity was essential to its educational mission. 138
Accordingly, it found the benefits of the admissions policy promoted a "'cross-racial understanding'," which broke down
stereotypes, and allowed students a greater understanding of
people of different races. 139 These benefits created a "livelier,
more spirited" class discussion as well as "better prepare[d]
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society."14o
As a result, the Court held that admitting a "'critical mass' of
underrepresented minorities [was] necessary to further [the
Law School's] compelling interest in securing the educational
benefits of a diverse student body.m41
Next, the Court examined whether the policy was narrowly
tailored to achieve its compelling interest. 142 In doing so, it followed the narrow tailoring principles laid out in Powell's Bakke
opinion. 143 In Bakke, the Court struck down the use of a quota
system to achieve racial diversity, because it would "insulate
each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications
from competition with all other applicants.m44 Instead, the
Court articulated that the admissions program must be flexi[d. at 319.
[d. at 321-22. (fmding that the District Court applied strict scrutiny and determined the admissions policy was unlawful). The court determined that the Law
School's interest in compiling a diverse student body was not compelling, because
Bakke did not authorize the promotion of a diverse classroom as a permissible interest.
[d. at 321. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment and held that
Justice Powell's opinion with respect to diversity was the controlling rationale. [d. at
32l.
137 [d. at 327. The issue was "[wlhether diversity is a compelling interest that can
justifY the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting applicants for admission to public
universities." [d. at 322.
136 [d. at 328.
139 [d. at 330.
135

136

[d.
[d. at 333.
142 [d.
143 [d. at 334 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (Powell, J.)).
144 [d. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (Powell, J.)).

140

141
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ble, possibly using race as a "plus" factor, but the elements of
diversity should be considered in light of all of the qualifications of each applicant. 145
Under the reasons set forth in Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke, the Court in Grutter concluded that the Law School did
not operate the "critical mass" policy as a quota. I46 It reasoned
that "some attention to numbers," will not convert an already
"flexible admissions [policy] into a rigid quota.»!47 Again, the
Court emphasized that a race-conscious admissions policy must
be flexible enough to ensure that race will not be the determining factor in the application. I48
Based on the above analysis, the Court determined that
the Law School's admissions policy did not automatically admit
students according to anyone of the "soft variables.»!4> In addition, the Court found that the policy did not provide any predetermined or mechanical "bonuses" merely on the basis of an
applicant's race. 150 In fact, the Court found that the Law
School's program was sufficiently similar to the Harvard Plan
described by Powell in Bakke. 151 As such, the Court determined
that the policy was "flexible enough to consider all pertinent
elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of
each applicant to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same
weight. m52
The Court also decided that the Law School earnestly considered race-neutral alternatives to its program. I5a The District
Court had criticized the Law School for failing to consider alternatives such as a random lottery or decreasing the weight of
undergraduate grades and admission test scores. I54 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found these alternatives required a
"dramatic sacrifice of diversity" and the academic quality of all
admitted students. 155 In addition, the Court trusted the Law
Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.)).
Id. at 335.
147 Id. at 336 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323 (Powell, J.)).
148 Id. at 337.
9
1< Id.
ISO Id.
151 Id.; see infra note 103 and accompanying text.
152 Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.)).
153 Id. at 340.
154 Id.
155 Id.
140

146
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School to terminate its race-conscious admissions policy upon
developing a satisfactory race-neutral alternative. 15s The Court,
therefore, held that "the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining
education benefits that flow from a diverse student body.»!·7
2.

Gratz v. Bollinger

In the same term that the Supreme Court decided Grutter,
it granted certiorari in Gratz v. Bollinger to determine whether
racial preferences in the University of Michigan's admissions
policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 158 The
Court, upon the same type of objections to the admissions policy as in Grutter, decided that the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts's (hereinafter "LSA")
admissions program violated constitutional and statutory provisions against race-based decision-making. 159 LSA's admissions policy and the Law School's admissions policy differed
significantly. ISO
A critical distinction between the two admissions policies
was the numeric guideline for admitting students based on racial preferences. lSI LSA's program automatically awarded "underrepresented" applicants twenty points. ,s2 Its sole consideration for determining whether students were underrepresented
was a review ofthe application to determine whether the applicant belonged to a minority.,s3 In addition, distributing twenty
points accounted for one-fifth of the total points necessary for
admission. IS.
Moreover, the twenty points awarded to underrepresented
applicants represented a racial classification. ,s5 The Court,

Id. at 343.
157Id.
168 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 249.
159 Id. at 250.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 270.
162Id. at 271-72.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 270.
156

165

See id.
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therefore, applied strict scrutiny. 166 Once more, the Court
looked to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke for guidance. 167
Bakke emphasized that an admissions program involving race
or ethnic backgrounds is permissible when race is considered a
"plus" in the applicant's file. 16s The system also should be flexible enough to consider "all pertinent elements of diversity in
light ofthe particular qualifications of each applicant." 169 LSA's
program did not offer applicants the individualized selection
process described in Powell's Bakke opinion. 170 Thus, the Court
in Gratz held that because LSA's use of race in its admissions
policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity, its asserted interest, the admissions policy, would not survive strict
scrutiny.l7l
II.

APPLICATION IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT

The Supreme Court's analysis in both Grutter and Gratz
created the parameters the Ninth Circuit utilized when it decided Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District Number 1.172
A.

DISTRICT COURT

First, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington had to determine the standard of review
for analyzing alleged equal protection violations. 173 The court
decided that because the School District's "open choice" policy
relied on racial classifications, it had to use strict scrutiny to
determine its constitutionality.17' The school board considered
the benefits of a more diverse student body to establish its purpose. 175 It determined the benefits from diversity included in166 [d. Under a strict scrutiny standard, LSA's admissions program could only use
race to further a compelling governmental interest by narrowly tailored means. [d.
167 [d.
166 [d. at 270-71 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.)).
169 [d. at 27l.
170 [d. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.)).
171 [d. at 275.
172 See infra notes 188-254 and accompanying text.
173 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 137 F. Supp. 2d
1224, 1232 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
225-26 (1995)).
174 [d.
17. [d.
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creasing classroom discussion of racial and ethnic issues,
"teaching students to become citizens of a multi-raciaVmultiethnic world," and allowing for different perspectives absent
from a diverse classroom atmosphere. 176
Consequently, the District Court found that the School
District's interests were not only to promote diversity, but also,
to ameliorate the de facto effects of residential segregation in
Seattle.177 Without such a policy, the court felt the school system would revert back to highly segregated schools due to the
disproportionate distribution of race throughout Seattle's
neighborhoods. As such, the court decided that preventing resegregation was a compelling interest. 179 Accordingly, when the
District Court analyzed Bakke, it found that Justice Powell's
opinion was not as forceful when considering racial preferences
earlier in a child's education. ISO The court, therefore, held that
the School District met their burden in establishing that the
"open choice" policy furthered a compelling governmental interest.ISI
Next, the District Court considered whether the program
was narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of reducing racial isolation resulting from de facto segregation. ls2 It decided the plan
did not mandate a specific quota, because it allowed for a fifteen percent deviation from the sixty/forty nonwhite to white
ratio before race was taken into account. IS' The court also found
the School District limited the racial tiebreaker by only applying it to ninth graders. IS. Moreover, the racial tiebreaker terminated once an entering class was racially "in balance. ms5 The
court, therefore, concluded that the "open choice" policy was
narrowly tailored to further compelling interests and granted
17s

176Id. (quoting and citing School District's Mins. of Exec. Sess. of Bd. of Directors,
Nov. 17, 1999).
177 Id. at 1236.
176 Id. at 1235.
179 Id. at 1237.
160 Id. at 1235 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
16 (1971) (fInding that "[slchool authorities are traditionally charged with broad power
to formulate and implement educational policy", even possibly prescribing a racial
proportion within a school that reflects society).
161 Id. at 1236.
182
183
184
I ..

Id.
Id. at 1239.
Id.
Id.
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the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the
state and federal law claims.ls6 Subsequently, the non-profit
corporation Parents Involved In Community Schools appealed. ls7
B.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY

Parents Involved II was then reviewed by the Ninth Circuit
to determine whether the School District's "open choice" policy
violated of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. lss The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District
Court that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. lS9 In addition, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the School
District satisfied its burden articulating a compelling interest
for the use of a racial classification. 190
In doing so, it relied heavily on Grutter and Gratz to analyze whether the School District's diversity interest was compelling. 19l The School District wanted to achieve several objectives with the implementation of its "open choice" policy!92 It
emphasized that diversity in schools better prepares students
for a multi-racial world by increasing racial and ethnic discussions involving diverse perspectives. 193 Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit determined that although Grutter examined the diversity interests of a university environment, the decision was also
applicable to high schools. 19' The court found no substantial
difference in the government's interest in providing diverse
interactions among eighteen year-old high school seniors and
Id. at 1240.
Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 953.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 960.
180 Id. at 964.
191 Id. at 961-64.
192 Id. at 961. The School District desired to achieve: "the educational benefits of
attending a racially and ethnically diverse school; integration of schools which, as a
result of housing patterns and the tendency of many parents to choose schools close to
home, would otherwise tend to become racially isolated; ensuring that public institutions are open and available to all segments of American society; alleviating de facto
segregation; increasing racial and cultural understanding; avoiding racial isolation;
fostering cross-racial friendships; and reducing prejudice and increasing understanding
of cultural differences." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
193 Id. at 961.
194 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 964 (emphasis added) (quoting Grutter, 539
U.S. at 330).
186
187
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eighteen year-old college freshmen. '•5 Accordingly, it decided
the benefits of a diverse classroom were "as compelling in the
high school context as they are in higher education.!!!·B Thus,
the Ninth Circuit majority concluded that the School District's
diversity interest was a constitutionally accepted compelling
interest. '•
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit did not consider the remedying of de facto segregation from Seattle's housing patterns a
compelling interest. lOB However, the Ninth Circuit noted that
the Supreme Court has never held remedying past discrimination as the only use of racial preferences that could withstand
strict scrutiny. As a result, the court concluded the compelling interest was the benefit created from the presence of racial
and ethnic diversity in educational institutions!OO Thus, the
School District could employ a race-conscious placement policy
if its means to diversify were narrowly tailored. 201
The Ninth Circuit used several governing constraints to
determine whether the School District's "open choice" policy
utilized the least restrictive means. 202 First, the court prohibited mechanical racial quotas for non-remedial purposes!03 Accordingly, the policy had to be flexible enough to evaluate each
applicant's potential diversity contributions individually:o,
7

I..

195 Id. (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The 'educational
benefit' that the University seeks to achieve by racial discrimination consists, according to the Court, of 'cross-racial understanding' and 'better preparation of students for
an increasingly diverse workforce and society,' all of which is necessary not only for
work, but also for good 'citizenship.' This is not, of course, an 'educational benefit' but
the same lesson taught to people three feet shorter and twenty years younger in institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school kindergartens." (alterations
omitted) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331)).
196 Id.
107 Id. at 964.
198 Id. at 961.
199 Id. at 962 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (O'Connor, J.)).
200 Id. at 964.
201Id.
202 Id. at 968-69 (taking the six constraints from "Grutter and Gratz" and "wellestablished narrow tailoring principles~) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz, 539 U.S.
244).
203 Id. at 968 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 293 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)
("Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke rules out a racial quota or set-aside, in which race is
the sole factor of eligibility for certain places in a class"); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334).
204 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 968 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-74; Grutter,
539 U.S. at 337-39; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 & 317-18; Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 345 (4th Cir. 2001); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790,
798, 800 (lst Cir. 1998); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123,
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Next, the court examined whether the School District earnestly
considered race-neutral alternatives. 205 Then, even assuming
the School District passed the first constraints, the court had to
determine whether they minimized the adverse impact on third
parties!06 Finally, the court determined whether the policy was
time-limited. 207
In the present case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
open choice policy failed nearly every test. 208 As a result, it reversed and enjoined the School District from using the racial
tiebreaker. 209

1.

Racial Quotas and a Flexible Nonmechanical Use of Race
If an affirmative action policy is not seeking to remedy

past discrimination, racial quotas are not permitted. 210 According to Grutter, a racial quota is a program with a certain fixed
number or proportion of opportunities that separates applicants disallowing a comparison for all available seats. 211 Prohibition of strict racial quotas will ensure that applicants are
evaluated individually and that race is not a "defining feature"
in their application.212
The dissent in the Ninth Circuit opinion viewed quotas as
irrelevant when assigning students to secondary schools!13
Two reasons were cited to illustrate why cases involving higher
learning did not provide a proper narrow tailoring model for
secondary education!" First, based on a particular applicant's
132-33 (4th Cir. 1999); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Ed., 195 F.3d 698,707 (4th Cir.
1999)).
2Q5 [d. at 969 (emphasis omitted) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337; Wygant v. Jackson Ed. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1985); Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706; Podbersky v.
Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 160-61 (4th Cir. 1994)).
206 [d.
(emphasis omitted) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341; Wygant, 476 U.S. at
287 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bakke, 438 U.s. at 308,
311,314-15 (Powell, J., concurring); Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 798).
207 [d. (emphasis omitted) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342; Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989); Hayes v. N. State Law Enforcement Ass'n, 10 F.3d
207,216 (4th Cir. 1993)).
206 [d. at 969.
209 [d. at 976 n.32, 988-89.
210 [d. at 968 (emphasis omitted) (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 293 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334).
211 [d. at 969 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (citations and quotations omitted)).
212 [d. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337).
213 [d. at 999 (Graber, J., dissenting).
214 [d. at 998 (Graber, J., dissenting).
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merit, a higher learning institution grants or denies access to
that limited government benefit!'· However, when racial preferences are used, race is a substitute for merit!'6 Second,
higher education seeks "true diversity" for an advanced academic atmosphere, whereas public high schools seek different
educational benefits that are more suitably accomplished with
an explicit determination based on race.
Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit majority determined that the School District's
racial tiebreaker was "virtually indistinguishable from a pure
racial quota. '>218
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit determined the policy was not
flexible. > According to the court, racial preferences for purposes of diversity must meaningfully be evaluated in "light of
all pertinent factors.'''2o "Automatically awarding a fixed racial
preference" based solely on race disallows the "far broader array of diversity characteristics" from influencing the state's
diversity goals. 221 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded the School
District's racial tiebreaker could not be narrowly tailored to
any purpose other than outright racial balancing:22
2l7

2l

2.

Consideration of Race-Neutral Alternatives

The Ninth Circuit also concluded the School District did
not earnestly consider race-neutral alternatives!23 Although
the School District was presented with such alternatives, the
Ninth Circuit majority decided the school board did not adequately weigh its options. 224
[d. at 999 (Graber, J., dissenting).
[d. at 999 (Graber, J., dissenting).
217 [d. (Graber, J., dissenting).
218 [d.
219 [d.
220 [d. at 968 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-74, 279 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337-39; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315, 317-18 (Powell, J.); Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 345 (4th Cir. 2001) (Traxler, J., concurring); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 798, 800 (lst Cir. 1998); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123, 132-33 (4th Cir. 1999); Tuttle v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 1999».
221 [d. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.».
The School District used a
"computer algorithm designed to implement the ceilings and floors framing its racial
tiebreaker." [d. at 969.
222 [d. at 970.
223 [d.
224 [d. at 970.
215

216
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The first proposed alternative was a citywide lottery.225 A
lottery system would require a "dramatic sacrifice" in student
choice, geographic convenience and program specialization:'·
In Grutter, the Court rejected a demand that the Law School
had to consider a lottery because the Law School might not
achieve its diversity goal due to an underrepresentation of
various types of diversity.227 Consequently, such a program
would "necessarily diminish the quality of its admitted students."22B Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit majority distinguished the School District's policy because it was compulsory
to place all students in a Seattle public high school. 229 The applicant pool, therefore, would not be subject to the same type of
"demographic skew" that could occur with the Law School.230 In
addition, the quality of students in the School District would
not be diminished because merit is not a consideration in student placement.231 As a result, the majority determined that
the reasons the Law School in Grutter was permitted to eliminate the use of a lottery did not exist for the School District!32
Thus, the School District should have given greater consideration to a citywide lottery:33
The second proposed race-neutral alternative focused on
factors, other than race, known to the School District .•34 One
specific example looked at the student's socioeconomic status.235
Using this type of criterion instead of race would foster crossclass as well as cross-racial integration!36 The Ninth Circuit
... [d. at 970.
226 McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 861 (2004)
(citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340). Jefferson County Public Schools "maintained an
integrated school system under a 1975 federal court decree. After release from the
decree ... the [district) elected to ... [use) a managed choice plan [with) broad guidelines" to continue integration. [d. at 836. This case arose because students and parents felt the 2001 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause. [d.
227 [d. (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340).
22B [d.
229 [d. at 971 (emphasis omitted).
230 [d.
231 [d.
= [d.
233 [d.
234 [d. at 971 (stating that possible usable data included: "whether a child lives at
home or in 'an agency'; if she lives at home, with whom; whether the child's home and
most proficient languages are English or some other language; and the child's eligibility for free or reduced price lunch").
235 [d. at 972.
236 [d.
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determined a diversity-oriented policy that did not rely solely
on race was a viable option that should have been considered
more extensively.237
The third alternative considered by the Ninth Circuit majority was to enhance the quality of all schools.238 Such a plan
would potentially attract a more diverse "cross-section" of students to less popular schools.239 The court determined the
School District was presented with an especially thoughtful
proposal addressing the dilemma in Seattle. Consequently, it
determined the School District did not give the proposal adequate consideration. 241 As a result, the Ninth Circuit concluded
the School District did not adequately consider race-neutral
alternatives. 242
240

3.

The Adverse Impact on Third Parties

The School District also had to make serious efforts to
minimize the adverse impacts on third parties stemming from
its racial tiebreaker in order to satisfy the second prong of the
strict scrutiny analysis. 243 The Ninth Circuit majority found the
School District was not minimizing the impact of the nonpreferred students because the fifteen-percent deviation from
Seattle's racial construction could have been larger!" It decided that an expansion of the band to plus or minus twenty

'137

238
2:l9

[d. at 971-72.
[d. at 973.
[d. Such a plan would focus on "educational organization, teacher quality,

parent-teacher interaction, raising curricular standards, substantially broadening the
availability of specialized and magnet programs, ... and supporting extra-curricular
development." [d.
240 [d. at 973-74.
The School District was presented with a proposal from the
Urban League. [d. at 973. The "Urban League convened a working group" to develop a
proposal for the School District in response to Parent's filing the lawsuit. [d. at 973.
The group included, among others, "a representative from the NAACP, one of the Parents, a former member of the School Board, a retired high school principal, the thencurrent President of the Seattle Council Parent Teacher Student Association (PTSA),
and a former PTSA President." [d.
241 [d. at 973-74.
242 [d. at 970.
243 [d. at 969 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 287 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bakke,
438 U.S. at 311, 314-15 (Powell, J.); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 798 (1st Cir.
1998».
244 [d. at 975.
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percent would not make a significant difference in achieving its
goals. 2'.
However, the extent of the impact on third parties is premised on the fact that every student denied his or her choice suffers a significant constitutional burden. 2.6 All the students are
equally subject to denial of their first choice school; therefore
all students are on equal footing. 2" Accordingly, each student is
allowed to attend one of the district's ten public high schools,
regardless of race. 2'S Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit determined the racial tiebreaker did not minimize the adverse impacts on third parties. 2'9

4.

The Policy is Time-Limited

Finally, the Ninth Circuit concluded the use of the racial
tiebreaker was time-limited. 250 A termination point assures all
citizens that preferential treatment based on race is temporary
and only used to assist the goal of equality.25! When a school in
the Seattle School District became "racially balanced" according to the aforementioned deviation percentages, the racial tiebreaker was automatically terminated.2•2 In Grutter, the Supreme Court decided merely to take the Law School at its word
that the race-conscious program would be terminated as soon
as practicable.
Under that standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded the time-limit was the only criterion that the School
District satisfied. 254
253

mId.
246 Id. at 1012 (Graber, J., dissenting).

247Id. (Graber, J., dissenting). "There is no right under Washington law to attend
a local school or the school of the student's choice." Id. at 1012-13 (Graber, J., dissenting).
246 Id. (Graber, J., dissenting).
249Id. at 975.
250 Id. at 969 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342; Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 510 (1989); Hayes v. N. State Law Enforcement Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 216 (4th
Cir. 1993».
251 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion».
252Id.
253 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 .
... Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 976 n.32.
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III. COMPARISON BETWEEN HIGH SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS

The Supreme Court's analysis in Grutter and Gratz implies
that diversity may be a "'constitutional predicate' for raceconscious affirmative action programs in areas outside of
higher education."255 When deciding Parents Involved II, the
Ninth Circuit applied the Grutter and Gratz analysis to high
schools in the same manner the Supreme Court did with higher
education. 256 However, high schools and universities do not
have the same policies and interests. 257 Consequently, reliance
on Grutter and Gratz is necessary, but application of the law
must be adapted to account for differences between high school
and university admissions. 258
A.

INTERESTS IN A DIVERSE STUDENT BODY

The diversity interest for high schools is arguably different
from that of higher education. 259 For example, high schools
share the university's diversity goals to some extent, such as
"diversity of viewpoint and background."260 However, those
goals are not the sole or primary interests for a public high
schooL261 Nonetheless, they may be for a university.262 High
schools have a simpler objective: teaching children to interact
with peers of different races. 263 Accordingly, diversity in earlier
education is essential to enable students to be racially tolerant
through "cross-racial relationships. "264
2M Joint Statement of Constitutional Law Scholars, Reaffirming Diversity:
A
Legal Analysis of the University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., 1, 3 (2003) [hereinafter Reaffirming Diversity]
(referring to the Court's statements in Grutter such as "benefits of aft1rmative action
are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear that the
skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints").
256 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 964.
257 Reaffirming Diversity, supra note 255, at 23.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 991 (Graber, J., dissenting) (citing Comfort v.
Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 381 n.90 (D. Mass. 2003)).
261Id.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 1001 (Graber, J., dissenting).
264 Id. at 991 (Graber, J., dissenting) (quoting Comfort, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 381
n.90).
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Although both the Law School and the School District
wanted to promote "tolerant, productive, and well-adapted
members of this racially diverse society," the Law School also
sought to enhance the academic environment so its students
would become accomplished, well-rounded lawyers:65 Both the
Supreme Court in Grutter and the Ninth Circuit in Parents
Involved II decided that diversity was a compelling interest for
educators.26B Nevertheless, exactly what that interest is may
determine what the proper analysis should entail. It is uncertain whether a compelling interest for secondary education
should be examined in the same manner as a compelling interest for higher education. As a result, the analysis relies heavily
on both the stated interest and the level of education to which
it is applied.
B.

DETERMINATION BASED ON MERIT

The use of merit in admissions is a major distinction between high schools and universities. A university admits applicants largely based on their merit. 267 Such an institution
strives to create an elite and a highly selective educational environment. 26B Alternatively, public high schools do not evaluate
a student's merit during placement. 269 If a school's admissions
program is based on merit, then it is sensible to disallow automatic admittance based on race because race can simply be
weighed with the merit evaluation. However, when analyzing
a non-merit based public high school's race-conscious admissions policy, it is more difficult to establish a program not determined by race. 270 Even when diversity is found to be a compelling governmental interest in high schools, "choice-based
programs will have greater difficulty falling within the example of the Law School because of the absence of merit based
admissions. "271 As a result, this distinction should not be over-

... Id. at 993 (Graber. J., dissenting).
21!6 See supra notes 157, 197 and accompanying text.
267 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 998-99 (Graber, J., dissenting).
268 See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
269 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 998-99 (Graber, J., dissenting).
27°Id. at 999 (Graber, J., dissenting).
271 Wendy Parker, The Legal Cost of the "Split Double Header" of Gratz and Grutter, 31 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587,603 (2003).
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looked when determining whether a race-conscious admissions
policy violates the Equal Protection Clause.
C.

IMPACT OF RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS POLICIES

Higher academic achievement is an important goal at
every level of education. Breaking down stereotypes and
prejudices is also important at each stage in life; however, facilitating interracial interactions at a younger age enables students to enter higher education having already combated such
problems. 272 Therefore, the exchange of ideas that are so important in higher education will have already been facilitated by
interracial interactions during earlier education!73
Many other benefits also arise when a secondary educator
attempts to diversify a school:" For example, the scholastic
achievement of minority students will be higher in integrated
schools. 275 In addition, minority students "develop higher educational and occupational aspirations that can translate into
greater effort and achievement.'>276 Conversely, university students are already striving to increase their educational aspirations. Furthermore, interracial interactions among peers will
increase the likelihood that interracial friendships will form.277
These friendships will reduce prejudice and stereotypes. 27a Recent research shows that "only a desegregated and diverse
school can offer such opportunities" to form "early school experiences in breaking down racial and cultural stereo-types.''''79
Moreover, these interactions also have been shown to "improve
citizenship, increase political participation, and foster volunteering. mao
Nevertheless, negative impacts also stem from the use of
race in admissions. In Bakke, Justice Powell reasoned that the
"use of racial classifications to desegregate schools was fundaZ72 Id. at 853.
Z73Id.
Z74 Derek Black, The Case for the New Compelling Governmental Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C.L. REV. 923, 950 (2002).
Z75Id.
Z76 Id. at 951.
Z77 Id.
Z79 Id.
Z79 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 992 n.9 (Graber, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).
280 Black, supra, note 274, at 952.
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mentally different from the selective admissions context because, in the school assignment context, 'white students were
not deprived of an equal opportunity for education.""81 In addition, he noted that the situation was very different from bussing students to comparable schools in different neighborhoods
in compliance with court ordered desegregation!8' The Medical
School in Bakke did not arrange for applicants to attend a different university in order to desegregate; without admission to
U.C. Davis, the applicant may have been denied a medical education altogether!83 Alternatively, educational opportunities at
public high schools are interchangeable!8' Thus, if students are
not placed in the school of their choice, they will still be placed
in another public high school. .85 For that reason, the negative
impact on a third party from a race-conscious admissions policy
in higher learning is potentially more severe than an "open
choice" policy at a public high school.
IV. PROPOSED RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS POLICY

Every race-conscious admissions policy in education is governed by the law set out in the Grutter and Gratz opinions!86
Nevertheless, strict adherence to their standards should be
adapted according to the proposed policy!8' For example, the
"open choice" policy that Seattle's School District devised was
not narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling interests; therefore it was not constitutionally permissible!88 However, some
changes to the School District's policy may satisfy the parameters set forth in Grutter and Gratz!8'
A.

INDIVIDUALIZED ANALYSIS

First, recognition of the Supreme Court's previous decisions regarding the use of race in admissions will provide helpBakke, 438 U.S. at 301 n.39.
Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 1001 n.25 (Graber, J., dissenting) (quoting
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301 n.39).
283 Id. (Graber, J., dissenting) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301 n.39).
284 Reaffirming Diversity, supra note 255, at 23.
285 Id.
286 See supra notes 255-258 and accompanying text.
287Id.
288 Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 988.
289 See supra notes 120-171 and accompanying text.
281

282
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ful guidelines. 29o The admissions program in Bakke set aside
sixteen out of one hundred seats for minority students.291 LSA's
program in Gratz awarded twenty points to every underrepresented minority.292 Both are rigid numeric standards that do
not allow for any individual examination regarding race. 293
Conversely, in Grutter, the Law School admitted a "critical
mass" of minority applicants, which was found constitutionally
permissible. 294 "Critical mass" was not quantified in terms of
numbers or percentages.295 Instead, the Law School simply
sought to prevent underrepresented students from feeling isolated. 296 In all three cases, the Court emphasized the importance of selecting students based on their individual qualifications.297
Merit, however, is a large part of an individualized selection process for higher education, as illustrated in the constitutionally sound policies used by U.C. Davis, the Law School, and
LSA.298 Consequently, the opportunity to evaluate students individually is diminished when merit is not a consideration for
admittance:99 Nonetheless, an individualized examination for
high school student placement cannot be eliminated:oo
As a result, the School District must evaluate more than
one factor, disallowing for anyone of these factors to be determinative!O' The first three tiebreakers should not be utilized
individually!02 Instead, each factor - sibling attendance, race,
and geographic proximity - should be used as a "plus" factor:03
Under these circumstances, placement will not be based solely
on race. 304

See supra notes 70-171 and accompanying text.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.
292 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
293 See supra notes 291-292 and accompanying text.
294 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318 .
... Id. at 318-19.
296 Id.
297 See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 71,127-130,167-170 and accompanying text.
299 Parents Involved II at 999 (Graber, J., dissenting).
300 See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
301 Parents Involved II at 968 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 293 (Souter & Ginsburg,
JJ., dissenting».
302 See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
aoa Id.
304 Id.
290
291
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CONSIDERATION OF VARIOUS RACES INDEPENDENTLY

Also, the race-conscious policy must consider each race independently. Acknowledging the wide range of diversity characteristics attributed to different races is essential. Otherwise,
the program will not maximize diversity benefits and will not
minimize adverse impacts on third parties. 305 For example, the
School District failed to acknowledge the diversity differences
among each "nonwhite" race."06 The racial tiebreaker was implemented when the school's racial makeup deviated by fifteen
percent from the white versus nonwhite ratio."07 The School
District did not distinguish beyond Blacks, Asians, Latinos,
Native Americans, or any other demographic to determine if a
school was out of balance."08 It, therefore, disregarded the various contributions students of different minorities would bring
to the classroom. As a result, a school district cannot maximize
diversity without considering potential diverse contributions
from different ethnic groups.
C.

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AS A FACTOR

Factors other than race can also contribute to a diverse
educational atmosphere. 309 Socioeconomic status is one such
factor."lo Using socioeconomic status as a factor in admissions
would encourage interactions among financially diverse students.3\1 A student's perspective develops from his lifestyle,
which is influenced by income, as well as by racial and ethnic
background.312 Thus, an evaluation of both criteria would allow
a more individualized examination of each student's likely contributions to the intellectual and social life of the school. 313

See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
See Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 955.
307 Id.
308 Id. at 985-86.
309 See supra note 234-237 and accompanying text.
31°Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
305
306
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QUALITY OF ALL SCHOOLS

Increasing the quality of all the schools within a school district is important. The problem with oversubscription stems
from the reality that public high schools are not equa1.3U
Eliminating the gross disparities in the quality of education
among the schools will reduce the dependence on the need for a
racial tiebreaker.3l5 Improving organization, teacher quality,
and broadening special programs are a few examples of
changes that will increase the quality of education at each
school. 316 In spite of this, these improvements involve time and
capital. As a result, improving the quality of education is a
long term goal and will not immediately satisfy the need for a
race-conscious admissions policy.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Parents Involved II understandably relied on the Supreme Court's most recent decisions
involving affirmative action in education, Grutter and Gratz.317
Although the outcome was correct under the circumstances, the
majority failed to acknowledge the various distinctions between
public high school placements and university admissions. Diversifying an academic environment is a compelling interest for
all education. 3l8 Nevertheless, the specific interest and the least
restrictive means to achieve that interest may differ according
to the level of education.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the need to examine
each applicant individually when using racial preferences as
part of any evaluation. 3l9 However, without a merit-based admissions policy, public high schools have less opportunity to
focus on individual characteristics. Regardless, a public high
school can still weigh other factors simultaneously with race,
encouraging a more individualized examination of students.
Although the Ninth Circuit should have considered the disparities between university admissions and high school placeSee Parents Involved II, 377 F.3d at 1008 (Graber, J., dissenting).
See id.
316 Id. at 973.
317 See supra notes 255-258 and accompanying text.
318 See supra notes 157, 197 and accompanying text.
819 See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
314
315
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ments, Seattle's "open choice" policy did not utilize the least
restrictive means to achieve its compelling interest, thus making the policy unconstitutional. 320 Nevertheless, the next challenged policy before the Ninth Circuit may pose additional issues regarding race-conscious admissions.
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